The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, as an abstraction of previously proposed cryptographic protocols we propose two cryptographic primitives: homomorphic shared commitments and linear secret sharing schemes with an additional multiplication property. We describe new constructions for general secure multi-party computation protocols, both in the cryptographic and the information-theoretic (or secure channels) setting, based on any realizations of these primitives.
Introduction and Related Work
The main goal of this paper is to propose new e cient secure multi-party computation protocol constructions based on generic primitives and to show that these primitives can be realized by using linear secret sharing schemes based on span programs. It is our hope that this link between span programs and multi-party computation can be the basis for the discovery of further relations between these two areas that have recently received a lot of attention.
Secure multi-party computation can be de ned as the problem of n players to compute an agreed function of their inputs in a secure way, where security means maintaining correctness of the output while keeping the players' inputs private, even in the presence of adversarial behavior by some of the players.
One can distinguish between passive and active cheaters: passive cheaters follow the protocol but pool their information in order to violate the other players' privacy. Active cheaters can use an arbitrary joint strategy in order to violate the correctness and/or privacy of the computation. Usually, this is modeled by assuming the existence of a passive or active adversary who can monitor or control some subset of the players. It is (at least initially) unknown to the correct players which subset is a ected.
Two basic models have been considered in the literature. In the cryptographic model, all players are assumed to have access to messages exchanged between players, and hence privacy and correctness can only be guaranteed in a cryptographic sense, i.e. assuming that the adversary cannot solve some computational problem. Privacy here means that an adversary's entire view of the protocol can e ciently be simulated in a manner indistiguishable from a real execution of the protocol. In the information-theoretic (also called secure channels) model, it is assumed that the players can communicate pairwise over secure channels, and the privacy as well as the correctness can then be guaranteed even when the adversary has unbounded computing power. Privacy here means that an adversary's view, when given the output of the computation, is statistically independentent of the other player's inputs and hence gives no Shannon information about them. We consider both the cryptographic and the information-theoretic models, assuming synchronous communication and static adversaries 1 .
The classical results for the information-theoretic model due to Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson 4] and Chaum, Cr epeau and Damg ard 8] state that every function can securely be computed if and only if less than n=2 passive or less than n=3 active cheaters are present. These result were generalized by Hirt and Maurer 15] who considered as the potential adversaries general sets of subsets of the player set, not necessarily speci ed by their cardinality.
Using terminology from secret sharing and from 15], we call a set of subsets of the players a structure and we consider security (privacy and correctness) of a protocol with respect to an adversary structure, meaning that the protocol remains secure even when an arbitrary set in the structure happens to be controlled by an adversary (which may be passive or active). Let Q2 (and Q3) be the conditions on a structure that no two (no three) of the sets in the structure cover the full player set. Note that the threshold situations considered in 4], 8], 14] and 20] are special cases, where the adversary structure would contain all sets of size less than n=2 or n=3.
The result of 15] can then be stated as follows: secure multi-party computation is possible in the information-theoretic scenario, while tolerating a passive (active) adversary, if and only if the adversary structure satis es Q2 (Q3). One -perhaps somewhat surprising -consequence of this is that in some situations, a majority of passive cheaters can be tolerated, provided we do not have to tolerate any dishonest majority. The protocols proposed in 15] rely on applying a protocol for the threshold case (e.g. 4]) recursively, so that subsets of players together run threshold protocols to simulate virtual players in higher level protocols. In general, the emphasis in 15] was on existence of protocols rather than on e ciency.
In this paper, we present protocols that directly and perhaps more naturally implement protection against any Q2 passive or any Q3 active adversary in the information-theoretic scenario. The Q2 and Q3 conditions arise directly from a natural condition on the underlying secret sharing schemes, and this also leads to a potentially more e cient solution than that of 15]. In particular, the complexity of our protocols is directly related to the size of a monotone span program 16] that rejects all potentially misbehaving player sets and accepts their complements and enjoys a special multiplication property 2 . One "spin-o " from our results that may be of independent interest is a new construction that builds from a monotone span program a veri able secret sharing scheme for the information-theoretic scenario tolerating any Q3 active adversary (the multiplication property is not needed here). Like in 4] and 15], our protocols have zero probability of successful cheating by an active adversary.
In the cryptographic model with an active adversary, the most general previous result was shown by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson 14] who proved that any minority of active cheaters can be tolerated, assuming that trapdoor one-way permutations exist. In this paper, we show that any Q2 active adversary can be tolerated, assuming that one-way group homomorphisms with speci c extra properties exist. Particular assumptions su cient for this include: the RSA assumption, hardness of discrete log in prime order groups, or polynomial security of Di eHellman encryption. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst result for the cryptographic model that goes beyond the threshold case. It can be generalized to rely only on the existence of trapdoor one-way permutations, but only with loss of e ciency. 3 This paper draws on three ideas appearing in 13]: the observation that in 4] the product of two shared values is de ned as a linear function of the products of the shares, the idea (independently discovered in the course of our research) of using homomorphic cryptographic commitments to build veri able secret sharing, and the idea of using a specialized zero-knowledge proof for proving correctness of multiplied commitments. One of the achievements of this paper is to show how general linear secret sharing schemes (not only Shamir's polynomial threshold scheme as in 13]) can be applied in multi-party computation, both in the cryptographic and information-theoretic setting.
The Tools: Shared Commitments and Secret Sharing
In this section we introduce some notation and state, at an abstract level, the required properties for our two main tools used in both the cryptographic and the information-theoretic model. Shared commitments (often also simply called commitments in this paper) are a generalization of conventional cryptographic commitments, which are in fact used as the implementation of shared commitments in the cryptographic scenario.
We use the following notation throughout the paper. The set of players is denoted fP 1 ; :::; P n g. In all models, we consider a particular monotone set A of subsets of fP 1 ; :::; P n g, called the adversary structure, as potential adversaries, and every set in A is called an admissible adversary. The set A usually satis es the Q2 or the Q3 condition. When considering one particular adversary A in A, then we refer to the players not in A as correct players. The function to be computed is assumed to be de ned as an arithmetic circuit C over some nite eld K.
Notation and Required Properties for Shared Commitments
To protect against active adversaries in a given adversary structure A, we will need a commitment scheme for elements in K. A shared commitment scheme consists of two protocols, Commit and Open. Both of these are initiated by one of the players, called the committer, in order to commit to or reveal a value a 2 K, respectively.
During Commit the committer distributes some information to the other players, possibly also involving interaction between the players. By the commitment, we mean the total information distributed to the correct players. We need the following basic properties: 1. Binding: For any committer and any admissible adversary, some value a is uniquely determined from the commitment, and an execution of Open based on this commitment results either in all correct players retrieving a, or in all correct players rejecting the outcome of Open. 2. Hiding: If the committer is a correct player and commits to value a, any admissible adversary learns nothing about a from his view of the Commit 4 protocol. Moreover, executing Open based on this commitment always results in all correct players retrieving a. In the information-theoretic (cryptographic) scenario, both properties hold unconditionally (relative to some complexity assumption). 4 We will need the following extra properties, where the Multiplication Protocol is only needed in case of an active adversary:
Homomorphic: From commitments A and B containing a 2 K and b 2 K, respectively, the players can, without communicating, compute a commitment containing a+b 2 K, or compute one containing a?b 2 K. Motivated by the particular known realizations of homomorphic cryptographic commitments, we will denote these commitments by A B and AB ?1 , respectively. This property also implies that without communication, constants can be multiplied or added into commitments. We will let A c ; cA; cA ?1 denote commitments to ca; c + a; c ? a, as computed from A. Each new commitment computed in this way can be opened by the committer, but we require that opening A B reveals no information about a and b other than a + b (and similar for the other operations). Multiplication Protocol: This protocol allows a player P i who has previously committed to values a and b by commitments A and B to commit to a value c using commitment C, such that:
1. For any P i and any admissible adversary, either c = ab or all correct players reject the outcome of the protocol (for the cryptographic scenario, a superpolynomially small error probability, taken over the coin ips of correct players, is allowed). 2. If P i is a correct player, the protocol always results in c = ab, and any admissible adversary learns nothing about c except that c = ab. Moreover, opening C reveals no information about a and b other than ab.
Notation and Required Properties for Secret Sharing
A secret sharing scheme can be de ned as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which takes as input an element s in K and outputs n shares s 1 ; :::; s n . The share s i will be a d i -vector of elements in K, and in the course of our protocols, the share s i will be given to P i (but will initially be unknown to all other players). Let d = d 1 + ::: + d n . For C fP 1 ; : : :; P n g we call a vector of length P i:P i 2C d i a d C -vector. For any t and any t-vectors u; v, the t-vector u v will denote the coordinatewise product of u and v. The standard inproduct of u and v is denoted by hu; vi.
There is a monotone collection of quali ed subsets of players, called the access structure. Any quali ed set can e ciently reconstruct the shared secret while any non-quali ed set has no information about the secret (perfect secrecy). A set of values that can be interpreted as the shares of a secret s of a quali ed set in a secret sharing sheme will be said to consistently determine s.
In our protocols, the set of non-quali ed subsets (the complement of the access structure) will coincide with A, the subsets of players that may potentially be under the adversary's control. Because we are dealing with only Q2 or Q3 adversary structures, the set of correct players is always quali ed.
We will need the following extra properties from our secret sharing schemes, where the strong multiplication property is only required in the case of an active Q3-adversary: 5 such that hr; s s 0 i = ss 0 . Strong multiplication property: With respect to an adversary structure A, the following additional property holds: let C be any set of players with C = fP 1 ; : : : ; P n g?A for some A 2 A. Let (s s 0 ) C be the d C -vector obtained by extracting from s s 0 the coordinates corresponding to players in C. We then require that there exists a d C -vector r C such that hr C ; (s s 0 ) C i = ss 0 .
The Commitment Distribution Protocol
This protocol is only required in the case of an active adversary and is de ned relative to an adversary structure A and with respect to a secret sharing scheme for which A consists of the non-quali ed sets. It allows a player P i who has committed to a value s 2 K by commitment C to share s among the players P 1 ; : : :; P n such that in the presence of any adversary in A, 1 . Either each player P j for 1 j n is committed to (the coordinates of) a d j -vector s j , such that s 1 ; :::; s n is a set of shares consistently determining s; or all correct players reject the outcome of the protocol 6 . 2. If P i is a correct player, any admissible adversary learns nothing about s. Any commitment distribution protocol can be used to realize veri able secret sharing (VSS). 7 This is achieved by having the dealer rst commit to the secret s and then use the commitment distribution protocol. Reconstruction is immediate by having each P j open the commitments to s j : incorrect players cannot contribute false shares, and shares will be available from at least the correct players, which is a quali ed set.
Multi-Party Computation: The Main Protocol
In this section, we give a bird's eye view of our multi-party computation protocol based on the tools 8 of Section 2. This view will be valid both in the informationtheoretic and the cryptographic scenario.
A remark on broadcast is appropriate here. Note that we may assume throughout that players can broadcast information. This is trivial in the cryptographic scenario, and can be simulated through a protocol in the information-theoretic scenario. This is non-trivial only with an active Q3-adversary. In this case a solution follows from using the result of 15]. We conjecture that an alternative solution is to use the protocol of Feldman and Micali 11] together with our VSS protocol described below, but at the time of writing, this has not yet been completely investigated.
Our main protocol has the same overall structure as many known multiparty computation protocols. There are three main parts: the Input distribution, Computation, and Output reconstruction phases. We note that the description is for the case of an active adversary. A (much simpler) description for the case of a passive adversary can be obtained by removing the commitments and subprotocols that force players to act correctly.
After the input distribution phase, each input value x to the computation is represented by a set of shares x 1 ; :::; x n , such that each P i has committed to (the coordinates of) his share x i . During the computation phase, we work our way through the circuit C one eld operation (multiplication or addition) at a time.
Finally, the outputs can be reconstructed since each output value will be represented in the same way as the inputs.
Here follows a more concrete description: 9 6 for the cryptographic scenario, a superpolynomially small error probability, taken over the coin ips of correct players, is allowed. 7 A VSS can be seen as a shared commitment for which it is additionally guaranteed that the secret can e ciently be reconstructed by the players. 8 In case of a passive adversary, the Commitment Distribution Protocol, the Strong Multiplication for Secret Sharing and the Multiplication Protocol for Commitments are not needed. 9 This protocol draws on ideas in 13] (see also the end of the introduction) and 8].
1. For each player P i and each input value x to be chosen by P i , P i commits to x and uses the Commitment Distribution Protocol to ensure that each P j is committed to a valid share x j of x.
If a player P i fails to execute this phase correctly, he is clearly corrupt, and the correct players assume default values for his inputs and shares. 2. For the computation phase, we maintain an invariant stating that whenever y is an input value or an intermediate result in C that has already been computed, each P i is committed to a valid share y i of y (initally, no intermediate 3. The following only applies when the previous operation was a multiplication. If the secret sharing scheme has only the standard multiplication property, and some P i fails to complete his multiplication step correctly, he is deemed corrupt, the players make public all the information sent to him so far, and simulate him openly after this point (this tells the adversary nothing he did not already know). Thus we proceed as if P i still participated in the protocol. If the scheme has the strong multiplication property, a player P i failing to complete his multiplication step correctly, is simply deemed corrupt and is ignored for the rest of the protocol. Now, each player does the following (our description is for strong multiplication; in the other case, read C as the full player set, d C as d, and r C as r).
Let C be the set of participants that still participate at this point. Suppose If M is a matrix with entries in K then M t denotes the transpose of M (we will sometimes use cols(M) and rows(M) to refer to the number of rows and columns of a matrix M, respectively). The image of M is denoted Im M and its kernel (null-space) by Ker M. Finally, a useful fact from elementary linear algebra is that Im M t = (Ker M) ? .
Monotone Span Programs
Span programs were introduced by Karchmer and Wigderson 16] as a linear algebraic model of computation. In this paper, we will consider only monotone span programs. Karchmer and Wigderson also described how span programs give rise to secret sharing schemes. 10 We assume that M is labelled in the sense that each row is indexed by some integer i with 1 i n, for some n, where every index i between 1 and n occurs at least once as the index of a row. Finally, let a 2 K e n 0 be given. A monotone span program is a triple (K; M; a), de ned as above. 11 10 We may assume wlog that e d. Keeping only a collection of columns (including the rst) that span the column space does not a ect the multiplication property de ned later. 11 Note that the labelling of M is only implicit in this de nition.
De nition
For 
Span Programs with Multiplication
Recall the de nition of the (strong) multiplication property for linear secret sharing schemes from Section 2.2. For completeness, we now give a formal de nition in terms of monotone span programs. It is easy to see that f(sup r) = 0 would imply that the non-quali ed set sup r could compute the secret in any execution of the secret sharing scheme, which is a contradiction. 12 
Constructions of Span Programs
We characterize the monotone Boolean functions f computable by monotone span programs with multiplication. We also give an upper bound of the minimal achievable size of the monotone span program in terms of certain logical formulae computing f. We will also prove that the converse is true. To this end we rst address how to construct new monotone span programs (with or without multiplication) from old. Let f, g 1 ; : : :; g n be any monotone Boolean functions such that each of them can be computed by span programs with multiplication. Say that f reads n bits, and the g i 's read m i bits (i.e. f and the g i 's have n and m i literals, respectively). Write (K; F; a; r 0 ), (K; G i ; a; r i ), i = 1 : : : n, for their respective span programs (assume wlog that for each of these programs a denotes the rst unit vector in each of their respective vector spaces of de nition). Write F i for the rows of F that correspond to the i-th literal of f (i.e. indexed by i). The following proposition is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 f(g 1 ; : : :; g n ) is computable by a monotone span program (K; M; a; r) with multiplication. Furthermore, rows(M) P n i=1 rows(F i ) rows(G i ). Remark. The claim in our result also holds if we disregard the multiplication property. Viewed in that way, our result is a slight improvement for the monotone span program complexity upper bound given in 18], Theorem 3.4, 4-th claim. However, our main goal is to incorporate multiplication. Definition 3 Let the threshold function 13 f t;n : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g output 1 if and only if the input string has Hamming-weight at least t. We call f t;n majority accepting if 2t n + 1. If 3t n + 2, we call f t;n 1/3-accepting. Lemma 2 Let f t;n be an arbitrary threshold function. Then f t;n can be computed by a monotone span program (K; M; a) having n rows, provided that jKj > n if t > 1.
If additionally f t;n is majority accepting, then the monotone span program is with multiplication. 13 Note that in general the dual of a threshold function f t;n is the threshold function f n?t+1;n .
Proof. The rst part of the claim (not dealing with multiplication) is wellknown. If t = 1, we have the trivial monotone span program (K; 1; 1). Else, let M t;n denote a Vandermonde matrix (over a eld K with jKj > n) with n rows and t columns, the i-th row being of the form 1; i ; : : :; t?1 i and i 6 = j if i 6 = j.
It is easy to see that M t;n can be viewed as a span program computing f t;n , with root a = (10 0). In this case the associated secret sharing scheme (as de ned in Section 4.2) is identical to Shamir's 21].
To see that (K; M t;n ; a) has multiplication, observe that the product h = f g of any two polynomials f; g 2 K X], both of degree at most t?1, can be interpolated given n points if 2t n+1. In particular, if we are given distinct values P 1 ; : : :; P n 2 Kn0, and the evaluations h(P 1 ); : : :; h(P n ), we can reconstruct the coe cients of h by linear operations (coe cients only depending on the P i 's) on the h(P i )'s. This holds in particular for the lowest order coe cient of h, which is the product of the secrets distributed by f and g in an execution of Shamir's scheme with threshold (t; n). This part of the claim is due to M. Rabin 13] . We cast it here in our model. 4 Definition 4 The size j j of a logical formula is de ned as the number of input wires to . For any monotone Boolean function f, the size of the smallest formula computing f and consisting of any threshold gates f t;n is denoted (f). If f is computable by a formula with majority accepting gates (resp. 1/3-accepting gates), then ma (f) (resp. 1=3 (f)) is de ned similarly to (f). We are now ready to prove the main claims for this section. 14 It is su cient that jKj > N, where N is the largest fan-in among the gates with threshold greater than 1.
13
Proof. Proposition 1 takes care of one direction of the rst claim. Now if f is Q2-monotone, it can be computed by a formula with majority accepting gates by Proposition 3. By applying Proposition 2 recursively (applying Lemma 2 to the gates of and choosing the eld K large enough), we obtain a span program with multiplication computing the same function as , having as many rows as has input wires.
4
If we only consider ordinary monotone span programs (not caring about multiplication), then we have from Proposition 2 and the well-known fact that any monotone function can be computed by a monotone span program over any nite eld: Proposition 4 Every monotone Boolean function f can be computed by a monotone span program with at most (f) rows, over any eld K with jKj > (f).
Finally, we de ne Q3-monotone functions, a subclass of the Q2-monotone functions. These functions are important for our results in Section 5. 
The following theorem is proved in the Appendix. 
Active Adversaries

How to Do Commitments
We rst present a generic transformation that converts a span program secret sharing scheme 15 (see Section 4.2) into another such scheme. Schemes of this new type will serve as the basis of our commitment and commitment distribution protocols. They are in fact robust against cheaters when the dealer is honest, but this will not be needed here. The proofs are given in the Appendix.
Let f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) be a Q3-monotone function and let (K; M; a) be a a monotone span program computing f, where M has d rows and e columns.
Share Distribution: (K; M; a) is public knowledge. Let s 2 K be the secret to be distributed.
The dealer chooses at random a symmetric e by e matrix R over K, subject to the constraint that the upper-left corner of R contains s. For i = 1 : : : n, the dealer puts U i M i R, and sends the matrix U i privately to player i. The actual share s i of player i is de ned as the rst column of U i . Note that s i = M i b, where b is the rst column of R (whose rst entry is s). Proposition 6 The transformed scheme is a secret sharing scheme for f as well. For each i; j, we have M i Uj t = U i M t j . Moreover, the scheme is robust against cheaters if the dealer is honest.
We will now extend the above scheme such that even with a faulty dealer, correct players are guaranteed to receive consistent shares of a secret. Note that M i U t j = (M j U t i ) t can be computed by player i. Hence, by sending M j U t i to player j, player i demonstrates that he has shares in share s j belonging to player j.
The protocol for distributing and checking shares is de ned as follows.
Step 1: Let s 2 K be the secret to be distributed by the dealer. Privately to each player i, the dealer sends the matrix U i . The actual share s i of player i is again de ned as the rst column of U i . Step 2: Each player i puts, for j = 1 : : : n, check ij U i M t j , and sends the matrix check ij privately to player j, who veri es that check ij = M i U t j . Note that check ij has d i rows and e columns. If player i did not receive U i of the right format, player i sends (representing the empty string) to player j.
Step 3: For each player j, if player j nds disagreements in values received from a quali ed set of players, he broadcasts an accusation against the dealer, asking him to make public all information sent to player j (since he can now conclude that the dealer must be faulty). If there are only disagreements with values 16
received from a non-quali ed set, player j broadcasts a complaint, asking the dealer to make public those check ij for which he received a wrong value from player i. Step 4: In response to the complaints and accusations broadcast, the dealer must make public all values asked for. All players check what they received against the information made public, and accuse the dealer if there is a disagreement. Now, the dealer must make public everything he sent to the new accusing players. This process goes on until no new accusations are made. Step 5: If at this point a quali ed set has accused the dealer, or if the information made public by the dealer contradicts itself, the players take a xed default set of shares to represent the dealers secret (in this case the dealer is clearly faulty). Otherwise, the complaining players take the public information as their shares. The following two theorems are proved in the Appendix. Theorem 3 If the dealer is a correct player, the adversary learns nothing about s, and the shares held by correct players consistently determine s. Theorem 4 For any dealer and any active adversary, the above protocol results in the correct players holding consistent shares s i of some secret s.
These two theorems enable us to establish the commitments we need. The COM-MIT protocol works as follows. To commit to value a, we execute the above share distribution protocol for s = a where the committer acts as the dealer. From this phase, the players only need to remember the actual shares (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) that they received.
As to the OPEN protocol, to open a commitment the committer broadcasts a, s 0 1 ; : : :; s 0 n , and claims that a is the value committed to. Each player i checks whether the set of s 0 j 's consistently determines a and whether s 0 i = s i . If any of these veri cations fail, player i broadcasts a complaint. If all but a non-quali ed set of players agree, the opening is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. Theorems 3, 4, and the Q3 property trivially implies the hiding and binding properties required, and the linearity of the span program used directly translates into the homomorphic property we need for commitments: to add committed values, the players add their shares. The multiplication protocol required is described below.
Commitment Distribution Protocol
A dealer be commited to value z 2 K by commitment Z.
Step 1: The dealer makes shares z 1 ; :::; z n of secret z (using the underlying secret sharing scheme) and commits to each of them using the commitment protocol.
Step 2: For i = 1; : : :; n, the commitment to z i is opened to P i , and all players send their own share of (each coordinate of) z i to P i . if the openings fail, oherwise the players take whatever is now public to be their share of z i .
Step 3: At this point each P i knows a correct share z i , he knows all shares of (coordinates of) z i distributed, and agrees with all correct players on these values. The only missing thing is that we don't know if the set of z i 's is consistently determining z. However, a set of z i 's is consistent precisely if some set of linear combinations of them are all zero. The coe cients of these combinations can be computed from the span program matrix. Therefore, using the linearity property, the players compute the corresponding linear combinations of the commitments to the z i 's, and the dealer has to open all of the resulting commitments as zero. If this fails, the dealer is deemed corrupt. Finally we compute a linear combination of commitments to a quali ed set of z i 's, which should reconstruct a commitment C to z.
We check that Z and C contain the same value by computing a commitment containing the di erence of values in C and Z, which the dealer must open to reveal 0. It is straightforward to verify that this protocol has the properties required in Section 2. Details are left to the reader. We are now ready to give the multiplication protocol, for which we are given commitments A; B made by P i to values a; b
Muliplication Subprotocol
Step 1: P i uses the commitment distribution protocol twice with inputs A, resp. B, so that now each P j is committed to shares a j ; b j of a; b.
Step 2: P i makes a vector of commitments to a j b j , for j = 1::n. These commitments are opened to P j , i.e. all shares involved in committing to a j b j are sent to P j , and P i sends the values he claims for all these shares. If P j nds that a quali ed set of players disagrees with the values received from P i , or if the commitments did not contain the right values (a j b j ), P j accuses the dealer and proves his case by opening publically his own commitments to a j ; b j . P i must now open the commitments to a j b j in public; if this is not correct, he is deemed corrupt.
Step 3: Let D be vector of all commitments made by P i in step 2. D should contain a consistent set of shares in generated from span program matrix M 0 , by the above lemma. This can be checked by verifying that some xed set of linear combinations of the entries in D all equal 0. The coe cients of these linear combinations can be computed from the matrix of M 0 . Hence P i can prove that the shares committed to in D are consistent by opening a number of commitments to reveal 0. Finally we compute a linear combination of the commitments in D using the entries in the recombination vector of M as coe cients. The resulting commitment, C is the output of the protocol (and is guaranteed to contain ab). This protocol has the required properties, since by the consistency check in step 3, P i has distributed in D consistent shares of some secret s using matrix M 0 . But by step 2, P i must in fact distribute a j b j to each correct P j , or be disclosed as corrupt. And since the set of correct players is quali ed in M 0 , we must have s = ab. It is also straightforward to check that if P i is correct, C is a random commitment with the only constraint that it contains ab. 19 6 Cryptographic Multi-Party Computations Let f be any Q2-monotone Boolean function. We will prove that in the cryptographic setting, one can perform general multiparty computations tolerating any single non-quali ed (w.r.t. f) set of active corrupted players. This is what Hirt and Maurer 15] prove to be the tolerance against passive adversaries in the secure channels setting.
According to Section 3 and given the results in Section 4, it is su cient to describe the necessary commitment scheme and the Commitment Distribution Protocol.
How to Do Commitments
We will use the cryptographic commitment schemes from 10], which are based on q-one-way group homomorphisms (q-OWGH). These commitments satisfy the requirements from Section 2.1, i.e. they are homomorphic and have a zero-knowledge multiplication subprotocol. The RSA, DL or Di e-Hellman assumptions are sufcient for e ciently realizing these commitments. In some implementations, the prime q can be chosen independently of the security parameter for the commitment scheme.
We will assume that commitments are unconditionally binding, i.e. the value committed to is uniquely determined from the commitment. In 10], also commitments that are unconditionally hiding are proposed. We may also use that type of commitments to support our protocol, but this requires a somewhat di erent set-up phase and is ommitted here for lack of space.
Each of the n players in the multiparty computation protocol generates his own instance of the commitment scheme (but all for the same q) and all broadcast the \public key" of their instances: this amounts to xing, for i = 1 : : : n, a (probabilistic) commitment function i ,i.e., player i commits to a value a 2 Z Z q by broadcasting C ( ; a), where is a random string. We note that a slight variation of the multiplication sub-protocol guaranteed by 10] can be used to show in zero-knowledge that one knows how to open a given commitment, or that two commitments contain the same value, even if the public keys involved di er.
Finally, these zero knowledge protocols require random challenges to be generated such that they are unpredictable by the prover. This can for instance be done by straight-forward multi-party coin-ipping based on the commitment schemes.
Commitment Distribution Protocol
We build a commitment distribution protocol generalizing Pedersen's non-interactive veri able secret sharing scheme 17]. A related construction for the threshold case was independently discovered in 13]. Our scheme works for any Q2-monotone function instead of \minority" only and is based on the existence of any q-homomorphic commitment scheme.
We will assume that each player initally publishes a public key for a (polynomially) secure public-key encryption system. Existence of such a system follows from any of the particular assumptions we can base our commitments on. In some cases, such as when commitments are based on Di e-Hellman encryption, this public key can be the same as the one for commitments, i.e. i can be used as encryption function when sending messages to player i. In such a case, the description below can be simpli ed considerably.
For technical reasons (i.e. to be able to prove security of our protocol by a simulation argument), we assume that whenever a player commits to a value or sends an encryption in the protocol below, he also proves in zero-knowledge that he knows the committed or encrypted value. . It follows by de nition of the commitments in Section 2.1 (when viewed as cryptographic commitments) that computation of these j is feasible.
For j = 1 : : :n, he puts s j ( ; : : :; s k ; ; ) k2R j and t j ( ; : : :; k ; : : : ; ) k2R j , where R j is the set of rows in M associated with player j as in Section 5.1.
Finally, player i broadcasts C, and for j = 1 : : : n, he sends s j and t j privately to player j, using secure public key encryption. Veri cation: Each player j veri es that M C j C = ( ; : : :; i ( k ; s k ); : : : ; ) k2R j . If there is an inconsistency, broadcast a complaint. The dealer must then make public s j and t j , and open the encryption sent to P j in the previous step. If this is correct and consistent, P j takes s j as his share, otherwise the dealer is deemed corrupt.
Finally, P j makes commitments to each value in s j using his own function j and new independently chosen random input. He then proves (in zeroknowledge) that these new commitments contain the same values as M C j C. 21 The analysis of this scheme is essentially the same as that of Pedersen's, taken into account that we work with a secret sharing scheme based on span programs for a Q2-monotone function and abstract q-homomorphic commitments, instead of with Shamir's secret sharing scheme and homomorphic commitments based on discrete logarithms.
